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This paper explores the relationship between the denomination of
public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime. Unlike indexed
domestic debt, foreign debt is subject to valuation e⁄ects from real
exchange rate shocks. In a standard set-up, where a peg functions only
as a nominal anchor, more foreign debt makes pegging less attractive,
because it increases the value of a ￿ exible exchange rate as a shock
absorber. This result can be reversed if we incorporate the stylized
fact that pegs have lower real exchange rate volatility, and if external
shocks are su¢ ciently large relative to domestic shocks.
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11 Introduction
The appropriate choice of exchange rate regime has been one of the most
controversial issues in international economics. Conventional wisdom sug-
gests that, in making this choice, policy-makers would weigh the advantages
of enhanced monetary policy credibility under a ￿xed exchange rate regime
against the ability to react to shocks under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime.
Given that the nature of this credibility-￿ exibility trade-o⁄ varies with in-
dividual country characteristics, there is no universal optimal regime to be
adopted by all countries. Historically, policy advice has favoured one regime
over the other at di⁄erent times, in parallel with the evolution of the interna-
tional monetary system. For example, most countries preferred a ￿xed rate
regime at the beginning of the 20th century and adopted the gold standard.
In contrast, a century later ￿ exible exchange rate regimes have appeared as
the preferred choice of a large number of countries (see, for example, Bordo,
2003).
In spite of this trend towards more widespread adoption of ￿ exible ex-
change rate regimes, many ￿ oats tend to be heavily managed, especially in
developing countries, a phenomenon referred to as ￿ fear of ￿ oating￿(Haus-
mann et al., 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Indeed, recent studies distin-
guishing between the announced (de jure) and actual (de facto) exchange
rate regimes establish that a signi￿cant proportion of the so-called ￿ oaters
are actively engaged in activities aimed at limiting exchange rate ￿ exibility
(see, for example, Reinhart and Rogo⁄, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger,
2005).
This paper provides a theoretical underpinning for the fear-of-￿ oating
hypothesis by incorporating a link between the currency denomination of
public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime. We adapt a standard
model of monetary policy-making so that real exchange rate movements cre-
ate valuation e⁄ects for foreign debt, and we also allow the peg to have the
additional property of reducing the volatility of real exchange rate shocks.
This is consistent with the experience of the advanced countries since the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system: the volatility of real exchange
rates has increased, without any discernible increase in the volatility of any
other real variables (Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Flood and Rose, 1995;
Hasan and Wallace, 1996; Mussa, 1986), a phenomenon that Obstfeld and
Rogo⁄(2000) describe as one of the six major puzzles of international macro-
economics.
In our model a country may choose either to retain the freedom to vary
its exchange rate or to peg to some zero-in￿ ation anchor currency. The
2country￿ s debt may be denominated in foreign currency or in domestic cur-
rency, possibly with some degree of indexation to the domestic price level.
An important aspect of real exchange rate volatility is its impact on the real
burden of debt denominated in foreign currency. These valuation e⁄ects
of real exchange rate movements have been identi￿ed as a major factor in
the negative output e⁄ects of currency crises in emerging market countries
(Frankel, 2005; Cook, 2004, provides a theoretical model), and there is evi-
dence that exposure to pro-cyclical valuation e⁄ects on foreign debt induces
these countries to choose a less ￿ exible exchange rate regime (Bleaney and
Francisco, 2008; Honig, 2005).
Our analysis provides a set of interesting results. First, we show that
the composition of public debt plays a key role in determining which ex-
change rate regime creates more ￿ uctuations in economic activity. More
speci￿cally, both in￿ ation and output are shown to be more stable under
a ￿ exible exchange rate regime in the absence of foreign debt. With for-
eign debt, however, this is not necessarily the case; the negative impact of
the valuation e⁄ects can outweigh the positive "shock-absorber" function of
￿ exibility when debt is denominated in foreign rather than domestic cur-
rency. Second, our results suggest that policy-makers are more likely to
adopt a ￿ exible exchange rate regime as the magnitude of shocks becomes
large, because of the shock-absorbing nature of this regime, but only if real
exchange rate shocks are similar across regimes. Otherwise, the bene￿t of
smaller real exchange rate ￿ uctuations under a peg may more than o⁄set the
bene￿t of ￿ exibility in absorbing these shocks. Third, the share of foreign
debt in total borrowing is an important determinant of fear of ￿ oating. The
greater the share of foreign debt, the greater the negative valuation e⁄ects,
which can consequently outweigh the shock-absorber bene￿ts of ￿ exibility
and thus increase the attractiveness of the ￿xed exchange rate regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic
model. The characterization of equilibrium under the two exchange rate
regimes is presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides a comparative analysis
of the two regimes and derives conditions for the optimal choice of exchange
rate regime. Finally section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The basic model
We utilize a simple model of discretionary monetary and ￿scal policy, in
which the government dislikes deviations of in￿ ation and output from target,
3and tax distortions depress output.1 Di⁄erent forms of debt provide di⁄erent
incentives to generate unexpected in￿ ation, and their cost (the ex post real
interest rate) responds di⁄erently to shocks, thus a⁄ecting the tax rate. For
example, an unexpected real exchange rate depreciation increases the burden
of debt denominated in foreign currency, which depresses output.












2 + (xt ￿ e xt)2￿
(1)
where LG
t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the government, ￿ represents
the government￿ s relative dislike for the deviations of in￿ ation (￿t) from its
target level (0) relative to the deviations of (log of) output (xt) from its
target level (e xt), and ￿G is the government￿ s discount factor. As standard,
the target level of in￿ ation is taken to be zero to indicate the desirability
of price stability. A non-zero output target (e xt) represents the bliss point
for output in the absence of non-tax distortions, for example, due to labour
or commodity market imperfections. Both the weight ￿ and the bliss point
for output (e xt) re￿ ect the political and the institutional structure of the
economy.
Output is given by the following production function: Yt = N
￿
t , where
Yt and Nt represent output and labour respectively in period t, and 0 <
￿ < 1. Distortionary taxes, which are the only form of taxes available
to the government, are levied on output at the rate ￿t. A representative
competitive ￿rm￿ s problem is to maximize pro￿ts Pt(1￿￿t)N
￿
t ￿WtNt, where
Pt and Wt represent the price level and the wage rate respectively, in period
t. A representative competitive ￿rm chooses labour to maximize pro￿ts
by taking Pt, Wt and ￿t as given. The resulting output supply function
is yt = ￿(pt ￿ wt ￿ ￿t) + z; where lower case letters represent logs, e.g.
yt = ln(Yt); ￿ = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿); z = ￿ln(￿) and ln(1 ￿ ￿) ’ ￿￿. Normalizing
output by subtracting z from yt for simplicity, and utilizing wt = pe
t, yields
the following normalized output supply function
xt = ￿(￿t ￿ ￿e
t ￿ ￿t) + u (2)
where ￿e
t is expected in￿ ation, u is a random shock with zero mean and
variance ￿2, and all other variables are as de￿ned above.
1Similar variants of this model are used by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997, 1999) and
Ozkan (2000).
4The ￿scal structure is the following. The policymaker inherits a given
level of public debt from the previous period which has to be paid o⁄ in full
at the end of the current period. Thus the cost of debt repayments together
with the current public spending make up the ￿nancing requirement in each
period.
In addition to the revenue taxes, the policymaker can also use the in￿ a-
tion tax to pay for current spending and debt repayments. The government
budget constraint is formally given by:2
￿t = (gt ￿ k￿t) + (1 + r ￿ ￿(￿t ￿ ￿e
t) + ￿sf)dt￿1 (3)
where gt is current public spending as a share of output; k is real money
holdings as a share of output and is therefore a measure of seigniorage rev-
enues; dt￿1 is the total debt issued in period t ￿ 1 (as a ratio of output)
that has to be paid back at the end of period t; r is the real interest rate;
￿ indicates the portion of debt that is in nominal domestic currency and
can be devalued in real terms through in￿ ation; f is the proportion of debt
denominated in foreign currency; s denotes a zero-mean real exchange rate
shock with a variance ￿2 (with a positive value representing a depreciation);
and ￿ is a regime-speci￿c parameter that captures the intensity of real ex-
change rate shocks (we set ￿ = 1 under ￿ exible rates and 0 <￿ <1 under
a peg to denote pegs￿favourable impact on real exchange rate volatility, as
explained earlier). Only when debt is indexed to the domestic price level is
the ex post real interest rate on debt constrained to equal its ex ante rate
(r). If debt is ￿xed in nominal terms (￿=1), the ex post rate equals the ex
ante rate minus unanticipated in￿ ation. If debt is denominated in foreign
currency (f=1), the ex post rate equals the ex ante rate plus the rate of real
exchange rate depreciation.
3 Characterization of equilibrium
In order to focus on exploring the linkages between the composition of ex-
isting debt obligations and exchange rate regime choice, we abstract from
additional debt dynamics and allow no new borrowing. Hence there are no
linkages between periods and thus all our results can be derived by using a
one-period framework. The order of events is as follows. At the beginning
2Falcetti and Missale (2004) use a similar representation of taxes, but without foreign
borrowing and seigniorage revenues.
5of the period, the government inherits an exogenous level of total debt which
it must pay o⁄ at the end of the period, issuing no new debt. First the
government chooses its exchange rate regime, which is either a peg (with
no possibility of devaluation) or a ￿ exible regime. Then it observes the do-
mestic shock (u) and the real exchange rate shock that we de￿ne below.
Finally, if a ￿ exible exchange rate regime has been chosen, the government
selects the rate of devaluation, e, which we assume to be directly controlled
by the policymaker, to minimize its loss function.
3.1 Flexible exchange rates
The relationship between in￿ ation and the external (real exchange rate)
shock is described by the following stochastic version of the purchasing power
parity condition:3
￿ = ￿￿ + e ￿ s (4)
where ￿￿ is foreign in￿ ation (which we assume throughout to be zero,
for simplicity), e is the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate (home
currency units per unit of foreign currency) and s is a zero-mean random
variable. Time subscripts are omitted for notational clarity given the one-
period nature of the set-up. After the real exchange rate shock s is observed,
monetary policy is chosen, which amounts to selecting e (or equivalently ￿)
in order to minimize the loss function in equation (1) above. The domestic
and external shocks are assumed to be independently distributed.
The government budget constraint in this case takes the following form
￿ = g ￿ k￿ + (1 + r ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿e) + sf)d (5)
where the full scale of real exchange rate shocks, s, is re￿ ected in the
￿scal burden (sfd), as ￿ = 1 under the ￿ exible exchange rate regime:
Substituting the output supply function from (2) and the tax rate from
(5) into (1), di⁄erentiating the resulting expression with respect to ￿ and
solving for ￿ under rational expectations results in
3Berger et al. (2001) use a similar framework in analysing the optimal choice of ex-






￿ + Z2fds ￿
Z
￿ + Z2u (6)
where superscript F refers to outcomes under the ￿ exible exchange rate
regime; Z = ￿(1 + k + ￿d); and Y = ￿gD + e x; where gD is the ￿nancing
requirement in the absence of nominal and foreign debt in period t and is
given by gD = g + (1 + r)d.
Equation (6) suggests that the deterministic part of in￿ ation bias (the
￿rst term) is a function of the ￿nancing requirement and the output target,
Y = ￿gD + e x; which might be referred to as the total structural distortions.
A rise in the ￿nancing requirement brings about a rise in equilibrium in-
￿ ation, so that part of the additional ￿nance is met through seigniorage.
The deterministic part of in￿ ation is also an increasing function of Z, which
captures the incentive to increase output through unanticipated in￿ ation.
This incentive is greater, the steeper the output supply function (higher ￿),
the larger the monetary base (larger k) and the higher the nominal debt
(higher ￿d). Clearly, in￿ ation is lower, the greater the policy-maker￿ s price
stability weight (higher ￿).
Substituting the equilibrium in￿ ation from (6) into (5) above and re-
arranging yields the following equilibrium tax rate under the ￿ oating regime





￿ + Z2 fds +
Z(k + ￿d)
￿ + Z2 u (7)
Equation (7) indicates that high in￿ ation reduces the ￿scal burden through
seigniorage (the second term), in contrast to the real exchange rate shocks
that have an unfavourable e⁄ect on the equilibrium tax rate under ￿ oating
(the third term). Because in￿ ation falls when u is positive, there is less
seigniorage revenue and a lower ex post real interest rate on nominal debt,
so the tax rate has to rise (the last term).
We can now represent the deviation of output from its target level under
the ￿ oating exchange rate regime by substituting (7) into the output supply
function in (2) and subtracting e x from the resulting expression, which yields
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7Thus the deviation of output from target is directly proportional to in-
￿ ation. Note that the external shock e⁄ect in (6) and (8) is zero if there
is no foreign debt (f = 0). Without foreign debt, the real exchange rate
shock is entirely absorbed in the nominal exchange rate adjustment, so that
in￿ ation is independent of the shock, as is output. Foreign debt reduces
the extent to which a ￿ exible exchange rate absorbs the shock, with a real
depreciation resulting in lower output and higher in￿ ation, because of the
greater ￿scal burden. As far as domestic shocks are concerned, foreign and
indexed debt are equivalent, and the only debt composition e⁄ect relates to
the share of nominal debt. The larger the share of nominal debt, the larger
is Z, and the smaller the e⁄ect of the domestic shock on output.
3.2 Under a ￿xed exchange rate regime
Under a ￿xed exchange rate regime the nominal exchange rate is pegged,
so e = 0. The peg also reduces the intensity of real exchange rate shocks,
which are only ￿(< 1) times as big as under ￿ exible rates. Under the peg
the government has no freedom to set the in￿ ation rate, which is now given
by
￿ = ￿￿ + e ￿ ￿s (9)
Given that ￿￿ = e = 0; in￿ ation will be equal to
￿P = ￿￿s (10)
where superscript P indicates the peg. Since s has a mean of zero,
expected in￿ ation is zero.
Equilibrium in￿ ation under the peg in (10) suggests that the required
tax rate in this case is given by
￿P = g ￿ k￿ + (1 + r ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿e) + ￿sf)d (11)
8The contribution of the real exchange rate shocks to the tax burden is
smaller under a ￿xed exchange rate regime because of the lower intensity of
the real exchange rate shocks under the peg, ￿ < 1:
Utilizing the equilibrium values of in￿ ation and taxes from (10) and (11),
it is straightforward to derive the output gap under a peg as the following:
(x ￿ e x)P = ￿Y ￿ ￿s(Z + ￿fd) + u (12)
Under pegging, prices will fall when s > 0, and this raises the ￿scal
burden unless debt is indexed to the price level.4 This increase in the tax
rate magni￿es the direct negative output e⁄ect of the external shock.
By comparing the equilibrium in￿ ation and output under the two ex-
change rate regimes we establish the following results.
Result 1. A larger share of nominal debt raises the volatility of output
under pegging relative to ￿exibility.
It can be seen from (8) that increasing Z reduces the sensitivity of output
to s under ￿ exibility. In contrast, from (12), increasing Z increases the
sensitivity of output to s under pegging. Exactly the same applies to the
domestic shock, u. Since Z is an increasing function of ￿, the share of
nominal debt in the total, the result follows.
The intuition behind this result is the following. A rise in ￿ increases
expected in￿ ation under ￿ exibility but also increases the degree to which
shocks are absorbed by in￿ ation. This is re￿ ected in the reduced respon-
siveness of equilibrium output to real exchange rate shocks in this regime.
On the other hand, under pegging, a real exchange rate depreciation brings
about de￿ ation, which increases the ￿scal burden through both negative
seigniorage and unexpected de￿ ation, given that ￿e = ￿￿ + e = 0: This, in
turn, requires a greater change in taxes and thus increases the sensitivity of
output to real exchange rate shocks. At the same time, unexpected in￿ ation
cannot be used to absorb domestic shocks under a peg.
4A case in point is the later years of Argentina￿ s currency board. From 1995 to 2001,
consumer prices fell by 1.0%, compared with a rise of 16.2% in the United States, in
whose currency most of Argentina￿ s debt was denominated, and against which the peso
was pegged. This contributed signi￿cantly to Argentina￿ s ￿scal problems.
9Result 2. In the absence of foreign debt, in￿ation and output are more
stable under the ￿exible exchange rate regime. With foreign debt, this is not
necessarily true.
Without foreign debt (f = 0), it can be seen from (6), (8), (10) and (12)
that in￿ ation and output are independent of shocks under ￿ exible rates,
whereas they vary with s under pegged rates. With foreign debt, the
critical factor is how much real exchange rate ￿ uctuations are damped under
pegged exchange rates. If ￿ is large, so that real exchange rate volatility
is similar under the two regimes, in￿ ation and output are likely to be more
volatile under a peg, whereas if ￿ is small, they may be more volatile under
￿ exibility.5
4 Optimal exchange rate regime choice
To establish the superiority of one exchange rate regime over the other, one
needs to compare welfare losses under the two regimes. Substituting the
equilibrium values of in￿ ation and output under the two regimes into the
policymaker￿ s loss function in equation (1) yields the following loss levels
under ￿ exible and ￿xed exchange rate regimes
E(LF) =
￿(Z2 + ￿)Y 2








E(LP) = ￿￿2￿2 + Y 2 + ￿2(Z + ￿fd)2￿2 + ￿2 (14)
where E(LF) and E(LP) are (expected) loss levels under ￿ exible and
￿xed rates, respectively, ￿2 is the variance of the external shock, s, and ￿2
is the variance of the domestic shock, u.
5CØspedes et al. (2004) present a model with sticky wages, in which a ￿ exible exchange
rate perfectly absorbs shocks, even with foreign debt. This explains their result that
￿ exible exchange rates are always better, despite valuation e⁄ects. As Cook (2004, p.
1157) explains, in a model with sticky prices this is no longer true. Our formulation is
more consistent with the large output losses from currency crashes (Frankel, 2005; Gupta
et al., 2007) and the evidence that devaluations are contractionary in emerging markets
(Bleaney and Castilleja Vargas, 2008).
10It follows that the policymaker would be better o⁄ adopting a ￿xed
exchange rate regime if the following condition holds:
E(LF) ￿ E(LP) = Y 2(
￿(Z2 + ￿)









Note ￿rst of all the e⁄ect of the amplitude of shocks.
Result 3. policy-makers are more likely to prefer a ￿exible exchange rate
regime as the magnitude of shocks increases, because of its shock-absorbing
properties. However, this only holds for real exchange rate shocks if they are
similar in size across regimes.
It is clear from the last term in (15) that a larger amplitude of domestic
shocks reduces the losses under ￿ exibility relative to pegging. To establish
this result for external shocks, we di⁄erentiate (15) with respect to ￿2, which
yields
@[E(LF) ￿ E(LP)]=@￿2 = 2￿(￿￿(￿fd)2 ￿ ￿2[￿ + (Z + ￿fd)2]) (16)
where ￿￿ =
￿
￿+Z2. Since ￿￿ is a fraction, and Z>0, (16) must be negative
for ￿ close to one. On the other hand, for ￿ su¢ ciently small, (16) can be
positive, provided that fd >0. This is because, with foreign debt, a ￿ exible
exchange rate acts as a less than perfect shock-absorber, and with a very
small ￿, shocks matter very little under pegging.
4.1 The role of public debt management
How does the composition of public debt in￿ uence the choice of exchange
rate regime? The di⁄erence between nominal and indexed debt (that is cap-
tured in (15) by the expression Z, which is an increasing function of ￿, the
proportion of nominal debt) is the temptation to in￿ ate away the real value
11of debt. Under rational expectations, this temptation is re￿ ected in in￿ a-
tionary expectations, which are pushed up to a higher level under nominal
debt than under indexed debt. This extra in￿ ation under nominal debt
generates additional seigniorage revenue, but this is more than o⁄set by the
in￿ ation losses, since it is an ine¢ ciency that results from an incentive to
generate unanticipated in￿ ation that can never be realized under rational
expectations. Consequently, for any given positive value of debt, nominal
debt generates greater losses under ￿ exibility than indexed debt. Under
pegging, nominal debt also results in greater losses than indexed debt be-
cause it magni￿es the e⁄ect of shocks: with nominal debt a real exchange
rate depreciation not only directly reduces output through unanticipated
de￿ ation, but also raises the ex post interest rate on debt through the same
mechanism.
If we di⁄erentiate (15) with respect to ￿, the proportion of nominal do-
mestic debt, we get
@[E(LF) ￿ E(LP)]=@￿ =
2￿2d￿2(1 + ￿d)Y 2
(￿ + Z￿k)3 ￿
2￿￿dZ
(￿ + Z2)2[(￿fd)2￿2 + ￿2]
￿2￿2￿2￿d(Z + ￿fd) (17)
The ￿rst term in (17) is positive, and the rest are negative, so that the
sign is in general ambiguous. Without shocks the sign is unambiguously
positive, since the second and third terms disappear when ￿2 = ￿2 = 0,
which means that in this case more nominal debt makes pegging more at-
tractive. This is because nominal debt increases the incentive to in￿ ate,
which under rational expectations only leads to higher equilibrium in￿ ation.
Shocks work in the opposite direction, not only because a higher share of
nominal debt increases the losses under pegging, but also because it actually
reduces the shock component of losses under ￿ exibility. More foreign debt
also makes it more likely that (17) is negative, because it increases the losses
under the peg from a given amplitude of external shocks. This e⁄ect is,
however, smaller if pegging is more e⁄ective in reducing real exchange rate
volatility.
Thus debt denomination emerges as an important determinant of the
optimal exchange rate regime choice.
Result 4. A rise in the share of foreign debt increases the likelihood of
adopting a ￿xed exchange rate regime when reductions in real exchange rate
12￿uctuations under the peg are su¢ ciently large, that is when ￿ is su¢ ciently
small. If the size of shocks is similar across the two regimes, the opposite is
true.
Di⁄erentiating (15) w.r. to f yields
@[E(LF) ￿ E(LP)]=@f = 2￿￿2d[￿￿￿fd ￿ ￿2(Z + ￿fd)] (18)
For a rise in foreign borrowing to increase the attractiveness of the peg
(i.e. to induce a rise in E(LF)￿E(LP)) the following condition must hold:
￿2 < ￿￿f￿ (19)
where f￿ =
fd
1+k+(￿+f)d. Note that ￿￿ and f￿ are both fractions so
this condition will hold if ￿ is su¢ ciently small (i.e. if real exchange rate
volatility is greatly a⁄ected by pegging). This is because, with foreign debt
(unlike with domestic debt), a ￿ exible regime cannot completely insulate
output and in￿ ation from external shocks, and when ￿ is small enough, the
e⁄ect of increased foreign debt on losses under a ￿ exible regime is greater
than the same e⁄ect on losses under a peg. This is more likely to happen
when shock absorption under the ￿ oat is less e⁄ective, with low ￿ and k,
leading to higher ￿￿ and f￿: Also, a rise in the share of foreign debt makes
it more likely that (19) will hold, given that @f￿=@f > 0: In other words,
the unfavourable valuation e⁄ects in the face of a real exchange rate de-
preciation are more likely to outweigh the positive shock-absorber function
under a ￿ exible exchange rate regime the higher the scale of foreign currency
borrowing.
Another interesting issue to explore is the role of the overall debt to
output ratio in the determination of the exchange rate regime choice. Dif-
ferentiating (15) with respect to the volume of debt yields the following
expression:
@[E(LF) ￿ E(LP)]=@d = 2￿(1 + r)Y (
￿(￿ + Z2)
(￿ + Z￿k)2 ￿ 1) +







(￿ + Z2)2[(￿fd)2￿2 + ￿2]
￿2￿2￿2￿(￿ + f)(Z + ￿fd) (20)
13The ￿rst two terms express the e⁄ect of increasing debt in the absence
of shocks (￿2 = ￿2 = 0) since then all the other terms go to zero. The
￿rst term can be positive or negative, depending on whether ￿(￿ + Z2) is
greater or less than (￿+Z￿k)2. Since Z is itself a function of d, it is possible
that the sign changes with the level of debt. The second term re￿ ects the
additional attractions of a nominal anchor when domestic debt is not indexed
(￿ > 0). The third term expresses the e⁄ect of foreign debt in amplifying
the losses from external shocks under ￿ exibility. The fourth term re￿ ects
the e⁄ect of a greater proportion of domestic debt being nominal rather
than indexed in reducing the losses from either domestic or external shocks
under ￿ exibility. Finally, the last term captures the ampli￿cation of losses
from external shocks under a peg with nominal or foreign debt. The more
e⁄ective is pegging at reducing the amplitude of external shocks (i.e. the
smaller is ￿), the smaller is the last term, and so the more likely it is that
the attractiveness of pegging increases with the volume of debt.
4.2 Discussion
The previous section has explored the issue of exchange rate regime choice
by explicitly linking this decision to the composition of public debt. In the
model, the government faces a simple choice between pegging the exchange
rate and losing the capacity to react to shocks, on the one hand, and keeping
the freedom to react, but losing the advantages of having a nominal anchor,
on the other. This is a familiar set-up, to which we have added the possibility
that the peg also reduces the amplitude of real exchange rate shocks. The
optimal choice of exchange rate regime depends on the absolute and relative
amplitude of domestic and external shocks, how much they are damped by
pegging, and the volume and composition of debt.
With purely domestic debt (indexed or not), a ￿ exible exchange rate can
perfectly absorb external (but not domestic) shocks, so the equilibrium lev-
els of output and in￿ ation are independent of external shocks. With foreign
debt, this is no longer true since the valuation e⁄ects of real exchange rate
movements cannot be avoided. When these valuation e⁄ects are adverse
(i.e. in the event of a real depreciation), a degree of unanticipated in￿ ation
is chosen in order to mitigate the decline in output. Under pegging, shocks
cannot be absorbed in any way, and the impact of external shocks is mag-
ni￿ed with a greater share of nominal and/or foreign debt. The welfare
losses from shocks are de￿nitely greater under pegging if external shocks
are of the same magnitude as under ￿ exibility; but they may be less if real
14exchange rate volatility is su¢ ciently reduced under a peg, and if external
shocks are large enough relative to domestic shocks. Consequently, the
shock-absorbing function of ￿ exibility is less valuable in the latter case.
A larger debt tends to increase losses, but whether it does so more under
pegging or ￿ exibility depends on a number of factors. To the extent that
the debt is in nominal domestic currency, it is a question of weighing up
the additional incentive to in￿ ate without a peg against the greater losses
from shocks with one. The foreign debt component increases the losses from
shocks in both regimes. In both cases, however, the e⁄ect of increased
losses from shocks under pegging will be smaller if pegging is more e⁄ective
at reducing the amplitude of external shocks. Consequently, this is likely
to be a critical factor in determining whether ￿ exibility or pegging becomes
more attractive as debt increases.
5 Conclusions
This paper has explored the link between the issue of optimal exchange rate
regime choice and the indexation and denomination of public debt. With no
foreign debt, the choice between pegging and ￿ exibility depends on weigh-
ing the shock-absorbing properties of ￿ exibility against the nominal anchor
function of pegging. The same is true if external shocks are of negligible
importance relative to domestic shocks. How foreign debt a⁄ects the choice
of regime depends on the volatility of the real exchange rate under di⁄er-
ent regimes. If real exchange rate volatility is the same under a peg as
under ￿ exibility, then foreign debt increases the attractiveness of ￿ exibility,
because it tends to magnify the output e⁄ects of real exchange rate shocks,
thus making the shock-absorbing properties of ￿ exibility more valuable. In
the more realistic case where pegging reduces real exchange rate volatility,
however, denomination of debt in foreign currency can make pegging more
attractive, because the shock magni￿cation e⁄ect is damped under a peg.
This is particularly likely if the volume of debt is greater (and/or a higher
proportion is denominated in foreign currency), if the authorities put a rel-
atively low weight on the in￿ ation objective, if domestic debt is indexed to
the price level (which helps to insulate output against external shocks un-
der a peg), and if external shocks are more important relative to domestic
shocks.
Thus the model provides theoretical underpinning to the notion of "fear
of ￿ oating" in the presence of foreign-currency debt. In this model, it is
never optimal to choose foreign-currency debt, because its burden increases
15when output is depressed, so it has bad insurance properties. This is re-
￿ ected in the fact that foreign debt increases losses under either regime.
The implication is that it is important to develop domestic debt markets.
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